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Abstract. The management of threats and opportunities plays a key-role in enhancing project performance. However, there 
is a gap in literature concerning how general contractors manage threats and opportunities in construction projects, in 
particular in the use of time and cost contingencies. This research partially addresses this gap through a case study of two 
large Spanish construction companies. The research presented two key factors determining how the contractors analyzed 
manage time and cost contingencies: project objectives and existing mistrust among the contractor’s team members. The 
research also found that managers use time and cost contingencies not only to manage threats, but also as tools for manag-
ing opportunities, thereby providing insight into a previously undescribed form of contingency: the negative contingency. 
The research results enable a better understanding of the actual behavior of general contractors, which contributes to pav-
ing the way for developing enhanced methods for contingencies management.
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Introduction
Threats, or risks with negative impacts on project perfor-
mance, take place in every economic sector (PMI 2013). 
The construction industry, in particular, presents high 
levels of negative risks (Seung, Hyung 2004; Ballard 2005; 
Russell et  al. 2012). The materialization of threats may 
jeopardize the achievement of project objectives (project 
completion period, fulfillment of scope, achievement of 
specifications, profit, etc.). Yet, certain threats have to be 
assumed and accepted. Examples include threats that have 
not been identified (unknowns-unknowns) and threats 
that have been identified but cannot be fully mitigated 
(known-unknowns) (PMI 2013). Literature characterizes 
the concept of contingency within the context of the strat-
egies to face accepted negative risks: “The most common 
active acceptance strategy is to establish a contingency re-
serve, including amounts of time, money, or resources to 
handle the risks” (PMI 2013, p. 345). Common nomencla-
tures for this concept are “contingency” and “buffer”. Con-
tingency is more common when money is the resource. 
Buffer is a more common term when the reserve is of a 
different nature (e.g., time or materials). However, both 
terms will be considered equivalent in this research, which 
is consistent with industry standards (PMI 2013). 
Previous literature has widely discussed the concept 
of time and cost contingency as a threats-related tool, al-
though from the perspective of owners, rather than con-
tractors. Some efforts focus on methodologies to size con-
tingencies that could improve the current practice. Ford 
(2002) and Diab et al. (2017) are the only studies identified 
in the literature describing, though only partly, how con-
tractors actually manage threats-related cost contingencies 
during the construction phase. However, Ford (2002) and 
Diab et al. (2017) focused only on sizing cost contingency; 
hence, other aspects of the actual practices of contractors 
on time and cost contingency management during the 
construction phase remain undiscussed.
Notwithstanding, risk is a two-sided concept that in-
cludes both threats (i.e. negative risks) and opportunities 
(i.e. positive risks) (Hillson 2002; PMI 2013). Even though 
several authors have postulated that the management of 
opportunities is critical for project success (Hillson 2002; 
Leach 2003; Godfrey 2004; Molenaar et al. 2010; Laryea, 
Hughes 2011; PMI 2013; Ortiz et al. 2014; Eldosouky et al. 
2014), no references have been found about how general 
contractors actually manage opportunities during the con-
struction phase. Another aspect that some authors consider 
as critical to success is trust among the project team mem-
bers; indeed, Solomon and Flores (2001) consider that trust 
leads to cooperation, while Lofton and Monteith (2004) see 
cooperation as a source of competitive advantages.
Successful efforts towards enhanced contingency man-
agement rely on the ability to accurately describe reality. 
However, there is a void in the literature regarding how 
contractors actually manage threats and opportunities 
during the construction phase with time and cost contin-
gencies. The research in this paper aims to help describe 
how general contractor manage time and cost contingen-
cies during the construction phase of projects, thus filling 
this gap, at least partially, by answering two primary re-
search questions: (Q1) What factors determine contrac-
tors’ managerial approach to time and cost contingency 
management?; and (Q2) How do general contractors price 
opportunities? However, it was not the objective of this 
research neither to address in full how contractors man-
age time and cost contingencies nor to come up with a 
quantitative approach to model opportunities and threats 
in the construction project. Therefore, the specific quanti-
tative methods that contractors use to size time and cost 
contingencies during the construction phase have not 
been addressed. Through increased knowledge of how 
contractors actually manage time and cost contingencies, 
which is the gap this research intends to fill out, improve-
ments (e.g. quantitative methods to model contingencies 
management based on the current practice) might be 
better prescribed in the future.
This research presents a literature review on the attrib-
utes of time and cost contingencies. This review identi-
fies attributes, which form variables for the development 
of a case-study protocol that challenges ideas provided in 
the literature. Next, a multi-case study design, including 
selection of companies, sources of data, and key conditions 
to be achieved by the research design, is introduced. Then 
the findings are presented and discussed. Finally, contri-
butions of the research to the body of knowledge and its 
practical implications and limitations, form the conclu-
sions of the research.
1. Literature review
As mentioned above, literature has discussed the concept 
of time and cost contingency as a threats-related tool, 
although from the perspective of owners, rather than 
contractors. Hence, due to the scarcity or lack of specific 
references focusing on the domain analyzed (i.e. time and 
cost contingency management in the construction phase 
from the perspective of general contractors), references 
related to close domains (e.g. owners, bidding process, 
etc.) were taken into account in order to shape the theo-
retical framework for the research. Table 1 organizes and 
summarizes the references used.
The concept of contingency can be generically defined 
as a reserve for unexpected events (Howell 2012). When 
discussing contingency, the construction literature also 
refers to the nature of the reserve (time, money, capacity, 
specifications or inventories) (PMI 2013; Godfrey 2004), 
its purpose (to absorb uncertainty and variation or to 
hedge risks), and its final goal (to protect certain project 
objectives) (Querns 1989; Günhan, Arditi 2007; Barraza 
2010). In addition to these aspects, the PMI (2013) and 
Taroun (2014) also highlight the operational use of con-
tingency within the global process of risk management as 
a tool to actively manage risks. Regarding the party that 
defines and manages the contingency, Günhan and Ardi-
ti (2007) describe an owner’s contingency, a contractor’s 
contingency and a designer’s contingency. Contingencies 
can be set at various phases of the project development 
process. Contractors set time and cost contingencies dur-
ing bidding processes (Smith, Bohn 1999; Laryea, Hughes 
2011; Eldosouky et al. 2014; Asgari et al. 2016) and manage 
them during the construction phase (Ford 2002; Diab et al. 
2017). Some contributions propose or discuss methods to 
determine the initial size of contingencies (Yeo 1990; Se-
ung, Hyung 2004; Barraza 2010; Idrus et al. 2011; Bharga-
va et al. 2017). Others focus on how to dynamically adapt 
the amount of contingency to the existing risk throughout 
the project (Godfrey 2004; Noor, Tichacek 2009; Howell 
2012). A number of studies provide information about the 
decision-makers who are involved in contingencies man-
agement (Ford 2002; Laryea, Hughes 2011) or about the 
transparency of contingencies (Smith, Bohn 1999; Leach 
2003; Chan, Au 2009; Laryea, Hughes 2011; Goldratt 1997; 
Yeo 1990; Thompson, Perry 1992; Baccarini 2004). How-
ever, despite the previously mentioned relevancy of op-
portunities management, most of the authors use the term 
“risk” synonymously with the term “threat” (Dake 1992; 
Chapman, Ward 2003). Given the prevalence of these defi-
nitions, literature contains a bias that views contingency as 
a tool for threats management rather than a tool to capi-
talize on opportunities. In fact, only one effort was found 
analyzing the connection between opportunities and cost 
contingencies; indeed, Eldosouky et al. (2014) claim that 
contractors should assess not only threats, but also op-
portunities in order to properly size cost contingency 
during the bidding processes. Therefore, the fact that risk is 
a two-sided concept (i.e. threats and opportunities), allows 
exploring the potential role of time and cost contingencies 
to manage opportunities.
Thus, the theoretical framework for this research relies 
on four groups of variables related to time and cost con-
tingency management that have been drawn from exist-
ing literature: decision makers, transparency and sizing of 
contingency, and opportunities management. The follow-
ing paragraphs address each group.
Ford (2002) states that project managers are the main 
decision-makers. Laryea and Hughes (2011) challenge 
this assertion highlighting that several decision-mak-
ers may act, either in a coordinated manner or alone. To 
assess both the motivations of the decision-makers and the 
determinants of their decisions, it is relevant to take into 
consideration that different professional profiles would 
show varying degrees of risk aversion (Russell et al. 2012). 
It is also relevant to consider the decision-makers’ view 
about how risk evolves throughout the project. In this re-
gard, Howell (2012) provides an interesting insight in that 
decision-makers often underestimate risk at the beginning 
of the projects and, therefore, underestimate contingency.
Contingencies can be hidden or transparent. Contin-
gencies may be hidden within cost estimates and work 
schedules through inflated unit costs or longer task dura-
tions (Smith, Bohn 1999; Leach 2003; Chan, Au 2009; Lar-
yea, Hughes 2011). Alternatively, they may be explicit, as a 
fixed percentage line added to the base estimate (Yeo 1990; 
Thompson, Perry 1992; Baccarini 2004) or as time buffer 
allocated at some point along the critical path of the sched-
ule (Goldratt 1997). Furthermore, contingencies may be 
explicitly defined for each cost item or task (Smith, Bohn 
1999; Leach 2003; Chan, Au 2009; Laryea, Hughes 2011), 
or for the whole project as a generic amount of time or 
money (Yeo 1990; Thompson, Perry 1992; Baccarini 2004).
Chan and Au (2009) found that certain risk factors 
may cause contractors to either raise their bid price (i.e. 
they would add a positive cost contingency to the base case 
in order to hedge threats) or to reduce it (i.e. they would 
deduct a negative cost contingency from the case base in 
order to price opportunities). For example, knowledge of 
a specific market as well as behavior of competitors can 
be a key issue to establish these contingencies (Ballesteros-
Pérez et al. 2014, 2016). Chapman and Ward (2003) move 
beyond the observation and present the case for the joint 
management of both opportunities and threats. These 
groups of variables informed the research method. Given 
the abovementioned current gap in the contingency man-
agement body of knowledge, this research seeks to con-
tribute to document – at least partially – how construction 
companies manage contingences during the construction 
phase of the project.
Table 1. Summary of references
Subject Approach References
Concept of risk Risk in construction field Seung and Hyung (2004); Ballard (2005); Russell et al. 
(2012)
Double side of risk (i.e. opportunities 
and threats) Hillson (2002); PMI (2013)
Opportunities management and 
success
Hillson (2002); Leach (2003); Godfrey (2004); Molenaar 
et al. (2010); Laryea and Hughes (2011); PMI (2013); Ortiz 
et al. (2014); Eldosouky et al. (2014)
Trust and success Solomon and Flores (2001); Lofton and Monteith (2004)
Threats management and contingency Dake (1992); Chapman and Ward (2003); Ballesteros-Pérez 
et al. (2014)
Opportunities management and 
contingency
Chan and Au (2009); Eldosouky et al. (2014)
Concept of contingency Definition Howell (2012); PMI (2013)
Nature of the reserve PMI (2013); Godfrey (2004)
Use and purpose of the contingency Querns (1989); Günhan and Arditi (2007); Barraza (2010); 
PMI (2013); Taroun (2014)
Management of 
contingency
Construction companies and actual 
management
Ford (2002); Eldosouky et al. (2014)
Party defining the contingency Günhan and Arditi (2007)
Bidding process and contingency Smith and Bohn (1999); Laryea and Hughes (2011); 
Eldosouky et al. (2014); Asgari et al. (2016)
Construction phase and contingency Ford (2002); Diab et al. (2017)
Methods to size the contingency Yeo (1990); Seung and Hyung (2004); Barraza (2010); Idrus 
et al. (2011); Bhargava et al. (2017)
Evolution of the contingency 
throughout the project
Godfrey (2004); Noor and Tichacek (2009); Howell (2012)
Decision-makers on contingency Ford (2002); Laryea and Hughes (2011); Russell et al. (2012)
Hidden and explicit contingency Smith and Bohn (1999); Leach (2003); Chan and Au (2009); 
Laryea and Hughes (2011); Goldratt (1997); Yeo (1990); 
Thompson and Perry (1992); Baccarini (2004)
Generic and specific contingency Smith and Bohn (1999); Leach (2003); Chan and Au (2009); 
Laryea and Hughes (2011); Yeo (1990); Thompson and 
Perry (1992); Baccarini (2004)
2. Research method
The research team decided to conduct a multi-case ap-
proach. Two different construction contractors were 
chosen as the units of analysis; case study selection is 
addressed in section 3 of this document in detail. In 
order to guarantee the methodological and scientific qual-
ity of the research, the case study approach was designed 
to meet four conditions (Yin 2009): (a) construct validity, 
(b) internal validity, (c) external validity, and (d) reliabil-
ity. The use of two cases enabled the researchers to apply 
replication logic (both literal and theoretical), which in-
creases the external validity of the results in a case study 
approach (Yin 2009). This approach allows the possibility 
to analytically generalize the results in the construction 
management research domain (Yin 2009; Taylor et  al. 
2011; Miles et al. 2013).
The research process followed five primary phases 
(see Figure 1): (1) Literature review and research design; 
(2) preliminary study; (3) data collection and analysis in 
both companies; (4) cross-case analysis; and (5) exter-
nal validation. The research team developed a case study 
protocol that guided them throughout the data collec-
tion process (Yin 2009). The protocol consists of the fol-
lowing sections: (1) research project overview (objectives, 
research questions, etc.); (2) operating procedures (intro-
duction of the research team to the interviewees, access to 
jobsites, sources of data, confidentiality forms, material 
resources required, tentative schedule of the interviews, 
etc.); (3)  guidelines for the Phase 2 interviews with the 
general managers; (4) the Phase 2 survey questionnaire; 
and (5)  interviews guidelines and questions for program 
and project managers (Phase 3).
Phase 2 started with two open-ended interviews with 
the general managers of companies A and B. The general 
manager of company A is a building engineer. He is the 
main shareholder of the company and a member of the 
board of directors. The general manager of company B is a 
civil engineer, shareholder and also a member of the board 
of directors. Both general managers have over 20 years of 
experience in the construction industry. These interviews 
were as much a source of data as the kick-off meetings 
of the field research. At the start of these interviews, the 
authors thoroughly described the research project, its ob-
jectives and the support required from companies A and 
B. The general managers contributed their views regarding 
generic aspects of the research topic, which are discussed 
in the Research Findings and Discussion section.
In Phase 2, 53 program and project managers from 
company A and 203 from company B were invited to 
Figure 1. Outline of the research process
participate in a survey questionnaire. One hundred forty-
one (141) valid responses were collected, 47 from company 
A and 94 from company B, having a sample error of 4.9% 
and 7.4%, respectively, for a 95% confidence level. These 
response rates are acceptable for social sciences research 
(Teddlie, Tashakkori 2009). The survey results are dis-
cussed in the Research Findings and Discussion section.
Phase 3 involved the collection of documents, direct 
observations and semi-structured interviews carried out 
with program and project managers from each company. 
The size of project managers’ sample was based on satu-
ration (i.e., interviews continued until no new informa-
tion was gained) (Guest et al. 2006); six project managers 
and one program manager from each company were in-
terviewed. The interviews were face-to-face and generally 
lasted more than one hour. The interviews took place in 
the working environment of the interviewees (Woodside 
2010). Company A’s project managers were coded A2 to 
A7 and company B’s were similarly coded B2 to B7. Pro-
gram managers were coded as A1 and B1. The interview 
sample was intentional. The selection criteria were such 
that the interviewees needed to be university graduates in 
engineering or architecture with at least 10 years of experi-
ence on the construction industry and two years in their 
current position. Individuals without a university degree 
were included if they had at least 15 years of experience in 
their respective position.
To ensure a smooth functioning of interviews, inter-
viewees could raise any information on the topic that they 
considered to be relevant. The interviews were not taped, 
but a written transcript of them was created and recorded 
in the evidence database jointly through notes and narra-
tions of the interviewer (Woodside 2010). In order to en-
sure the traceability of results, a code was assigned to every 
entity of data (survey and interviews answers, documents, 
transcripts, notes, narrations, etc.).
The data analysis followed the approach of Miles et al. 
(2013), who view the qualitative data analysis process as 
three concurrent and interactive activity flows: data con-
densation, data presentation, and extraction of conclu-
sions. The generation and display of condensed data was 
an essential aspect of the analysis. Condensing data into 
simpler units transforms the raw data into categories 
which are consistent with the research questions. The con-
densed data could be displayed through matrices with 
rows and columns to fit with such categories. These matri-
ces facilitated analysis and pattern identification. The spe-
cific analysis tools that were used were “pattern matching” 
and “explanation building” (Yin 2009). The output of the 
Phase 3 was the findings of each individual case (A and B).
The cross-case analysis (Phase 4) compared the find-
ings of the individual cases and extracted propositions that 
enabled the formulation of provisional research results. 
The extraction of these results was supported by literal and 
theoretical replication logic. The final results were derived 
from 141 survey responses, 16 interviews (two interview-
ees were general managers, two program managers and 12 
project managers), more than one hundred hours of direct 
observation and a vast amount of document analysis. The 
analysis consisted of condensing data to perform pattern 
matching and cross-case analysis.
To address external validity, the results were explored 
through semi-structured interviews with program man-
agers from six additional construction companies (com-
panies E, F, G, H, I and J, as previously stated) (Phase 5). 
These interviews scrutinized a number of statements on a 
5-point ordinal scale. Each statement was directly related 
to the specific results shown later in Table 4. The program 
manager was asked about his/her level of agreement with 
each statement (strongly disagree (1); disagree (2); neu-
tral (3); agree (4); strongly agree (5)). At the conclusion 
of the six interviews, the authors calculated the median of 
the six answers to each question, evaluating the research 
results according to the following criteria: Strong validity 
(Me ≥ 4); acceptable validity (3 ≤ Me < 4); weak validity 
(2 ≤ Me < 3); non-valid (1 ≤ Me < 2). For each of the state-
ments, the interviewees were encouraged to add any com-
ment or opinion on the matter at hand. The conclusion 
was that all results had strong validity, since the median of 
the interviewees’ answers was greater than or equal to 4 in 
all cases. Phase 5 produced the definitive results of the re-
search, which are presented in the following section later.
3. Case study selection
The selection of companies was intentional (Yin 2009). 
As previously stated, the construction industry presents 
high levels of risks. Time and cost contingencies are tools 
to face accepted risks. Because a company has to prop-
erly manage risks in order to succeed in this industry, the 
study of any leading company, with a long history of suc-
cess within the industry, could provide relevant insights 
about the phenomena. For this reason, the cases were 
selected to meet criteria 3 and 6 in Table 2. Additionally, 
the selection of companies aimed to facilitate literal and 
theoretical replication (Yin 2009). To facilitate literal rep-
lication, two companies with similar features regarding 
the first nine criteria in Table 2 were chosen. To facilitate 
theoretical replication, the two selected companies present 
opposing characteristics in regard to, at least, one char-
acteristic criterion. The research team decided that the 
key opposing characteristic was the type of relationship 
between the construction company and its clients, which 
is a key factor in contingency management (see criterion 
10 in Table 2). Company A was chosen because it is an 
integrated company; it works exclusively for the developer 
of its corporate group and it obtains construction projects 
without participating in any kind of open bidding (Pellicer 
et al. 2016). Company B was chosen because it is a non-
integrated company. Company B procures its contracts in 
competitive bids to build the facility. Company B generally 
works in a traditional design-bid-build delivery environ-
ment, which is the most common strategy in the Span-
ish construction industry (de la Cruz et al. 2006; Pellicer, 
Victory 2006; Oviedo-Haito et  al. 2014; Pellicer et  al. 
2016).
The number of companies studied relates to the com-
plexity of the expected results (Yin 2009). Yin’s approach 
yields that for a descriptive theory – as in this research – 
two cases can be sufficient. Taylor et al. (2011) claimed that 
showing the applicability of the research results in different 
scenarios from the ones analyzed is a way to increase their 
external validity. Therefore, in order to contrast the results 
of research at other companies, different semi-structured 
interviews were carried out with program managers from 
six different construction companies (named E, F, G, H, 
I and J, considering that C and D were not used). These 
six contractors were selected to increase the breadth of in-
tegration when compared to companies A and B. Table 3 
describes the characteristics of these six companies.
On the basis of the companies studied, the domain to 
which the research results can be generalized is: (1) Span-
ish general contractors; (2) the construction phase of the 
infrastructure life-cycle; (3) civil engineering and building 
construction; (4) large and medium-sized companies; and 
(5) varying degrees of integration between the developer 
and the contractor.
4. Research findings and discussion
As described earlier, the selection of companies A and B 
was intentional and aimed at facilitating both literal and 
analytical replication. Nonetheless, even though analytical 
replication was included in the case-study research design 
and data collection efforts, all the theoretical constructs 
that are presented below have been developed only by 
means of literal replication logic, as both companies were 
found to act similarly in relation to the research questions.
Table 4 summarizes the research results. To map the 
findings to each research question, the results are identi-
fied with a sequential code, linked to the corresponding 
research question. Additional discussion of the results can 
be found in Ortiz (2015). The words “construction compa-
nies”, “program or project managers”, and the like are used 
regarding the findings of the research, and refer only to the 
construction companies analyzed (A, B, E, F, G, H, I, J).
R1-Q1: Mistrust among contractor’s crew members de-
termine time and cost contingency management. The re-
search showed that program and project managers from 
both A and B do not openly discuss contingency manage-
ment. The Phase 2 survey showed that both companies A 
and B include hidden time and cost buffers within sched-
ules and budgets. Along this line, during the interviews 
with A1 and B1 (program managers of A and B), both ex-
plicitly, and independently stated, that time and cost buff-
ers are hidden in cost and task estimates through greater 
unit costs, larger bills of materials or longer-than-expected 
durations. Thus, program manager A1 affirmed: “When 
scheduling projects, project managers may inflate, in a 
hidden manner, the duration of certain activities as well as 
bill of quantities. When budgeting projects, they may in-
flate, also in a hidden manner, some estimated unit costs”. 
Literature explains that time and cost contingencies can be 
Table 3. Characteristics of companies E, F, G, H, I and J in relation to the selection criteria
Non-integrated Partially integrated Totally integrated
COMPANY H
Annual revenues: >7,000 M€
Competitive contracts >90% of the total
COMPANY J
Annual revenues: 500 M€
Competitive contracts ~40% of the total
COMPANY G
Annual revenues:100 M€
Competitive contracts ~10% of the total
COMPANY I
Annual revenues: 1,000 M€
Competitive contracts >90% of the total
COMPANY F
Annual revenues: 15 M€
Competitive contracts ~25% of the total
COMPANY E
Annual revenues: 45 M€
Competitive contracts ~10% of the total
Table 2. Characteristics of companies A and B in relation to the selection criteria
Selection criteria Company A Company B
1. Field of specialization: civil engineering and building construction (residential,
industrial and commercial) general contractors  
2. Location: Spain  
3. Year of incorporation: prior to 1990 1985 1990
4. Number of housing units built over the last 20 years (more than 7,000) 16,700 9,000
5. Annual revenues (more than 50 M€) 85 M€ 300 M€
6. Creditworthiness: no bankruptcy history over the last 20 years  
7. Convenience: projects in the Madrid area  
8. Interest of the research: high  
9. Size (according to EU 2003): large  
10. Level of integration (% of contracts with internal clients): uneven 100% 10%
specifically defined for particular budget lines or sched-
uled activities (Yeo 1990; Thompson, Perry 1992; Barraza 
2010), and/or set up generically as a global percentage of 
the budget (Baccarini 2004) or schedule (Goldratt 1997). 
Companies A and B follow the first approach. Project 
managers of both companies were found to agree with 
the above statement (except for A2 and B4, who claimed 
that they never use costs buffers). The researchers also dis-
covered evidence in the written documentation (i.e. cost 
estimates and schedule) that corroborated the previous 
statements. Project managers A4, A7, B2, B3 and B5 ac-
tually showed the research team two different budget and 
schedule versions of their current projects – the official 
version and the actual version. All other project managers 
confirmed that they prepare also at least two budget and 
schedule versions, but they did not offer them to the re-
searchers. The project managers confirmed that the official 
version is shared with other crew members; however, the 
actual version reflects the personal and unshared view of 
the project manager and tends to be more ambitious than 
the official one. The quantitative differences between these 
two versions are due to the buffers hidden within the offi-
cial version. The hidden nature of cost buffers was already 
posed by Ford (2002), which is one of the few references 
found to discuss the management of costs buffers from 
the perspective of construction companies during con-
struction phase. Smith and Bohn (1999) and Laryea and 
Hughes (2011) also described the hidden nature of cost 
buffers, though within the context of bidding processes. 
The fact that construction companies set hidden buffers 
is not new, this research only confirmed the view of those 
authors, but at this point it is worth discussing why con-
struction companies act in such a way and forego the pos-
sibility to set generic, global and explicit buffers during the 
construction phase. At the beginning of Phase 2 of the re-
search, general managers of A and B stressed that if buffers 
were explicit, the program managers would remove them. 
During the interview that took place within Phase 3, pro-
gram manager A1 was asked to argue why project manag-
ers set hidden buffers. In his answer, he stated: “If I had 
had to approve a budget or a schedule with explicit buffers, 
I would have removed them right away, because I would 
have considered that besides those, the project manager 
had set up additional hidden buffers”. Project manager B1 
and all the interviewed project managers of both compa-
nies expressed their agreement with A1’s assertion. The 
conclusion is that project managers set hidden and there-
fore specific buffers to avoid detection from their program 
managers, which in turn shows that the relationship be-
tween project and program managers – as regards at least 
risk management – includes a level of mistrust.
R2-Q1: Time and cost contingencies restraint by proj-
ect management objectives. The discussion of the above 
findings showed that project managers usually prepare 
two different budget and schedule versions for their pro-
jects – the official version and the actual version. On the 
one hand, the official version is consistent with the official 
project objectives that program managers set, while the ac-
tual budget and schedule version is consistent with the ac-
tual project objectives that project managers set. As stated 
above, the research showed that project and program man-
agers do not openly discuss contingency management. 
Rather, the program managers consciously limit the ini-
tial size of buffers when establishing constraining official 
project objectives. Indeed, during the kick-off meetings, 
general managers of companies A and B confirmed that 
program managers usually establish project objectives. Ac-
cordingly, A1 stated that when determining time and cost 
project objectives, program managers explicitly take into 
consideration the hidden buffers that project managers set 
up to manage cost and schedule performance. Along this 
line B1 stressed: “If they know (the program managers) 
that a certain project manager is more prone to set bigger 
Table 4. Summary of results of the research
Research questions Research results Description of results
Q1. What factors determine 
contractors’ managerial 
approach to time and cost 
contingency management?
R1-Q1. Mistrust among 
contractor’s crew members 
determine time and cost 
contingency management
Time and cost buffers are hidden across schedule and budget 
line items
Buffers are often hidden due to the mistrust among program 
and project managers
R2-Q1. Time and cost 
contingencies restraint by project 
management objectives
Program managers define project objectives
Project objectives are consciously established to limit the size 
of time and cost contingencies
Once project objectives have been established, project 
managers are the main decision-makers on contingencies
Q2. How do general 
contractors price 
opportunities?
R1-Q2. Pricing of opportunities 
through negative contingencies
Project managers value opportunities through negative 
contingencies
Negative contingencies show potential reductions of time and 
cost
Construction companies jointly manage negative (i.e., 
opportunities-related) and positive (i.e., threats-related) 
contingencies
buffers, the program managers establish more ambitious 
project objectives”. A number of project managers ex-
pressed similar opinions. For example, B2 stated that: 
“By setting more or less ambitious official objectives, my 
supervisors take into consideration the management be-
haviors of each particular project manager”; whereas A4 
pointed out that: “Sometimes official objectives are so tight 
that there is no room for buffers”. 
This finding fits the view of Howell et  al. (1993) re-
garding the restrictive nature of project objectives. Howell 
et  al. (1993) considered that project objectives present a 
dual nature – they are both ends and means. Objectives 
are ends because they express the expected project out-
comes. Likewise, project objectives are means because 
they provide a decision-making guide for managers. Ob-
jectives thereby constrain managers’ behavior. In this case, 
the objectives constrain the sizing of time and cost buffers, 
objectives define a buffer ceiling. The program managers 
set the project objectives, but they do not explicitly direct 
how project managers size time and cost contingency. The 
practical impact of this finding is that project objectives 
are set without an explicit and shared valuation of risks, i.e. 
without previously defining buffers. In other words, pro-
ject objectives are consciously set to condition buffers, not 
the other way around. 
R1-Q2: Pricing of opportunities through negative contin-
gencies. As previously mentioned, risk is a two-sided con-
cept representing both threats and opportunities. In spite 
of the relevancy of opportunities management to project 
success (Hillson 2002; Leach 2003; Godfrey 2004; Mo-
lenaar et  al. 2010; Laryea, Hughes 2011; PMI 2013), the 
majority of the literature focuses on the management of 
threats. Yet, only one effort was found analyzing the con-
nection between opportunities and cost contingencies; 
indeed, Eldosouky et  al. (2014) affirm that contractors 
should assess not only threats, but also opportunities in 
order to properly size cost contingency during the bidding 
processes; nevertheless no references have been found 
about how general contractors actually manage opportu-
nities during the construction phase. From an operational 
point of view, this discussion poses another characteristic 
of buffers – their arithmetical sign. This subject was tacitly 
presented by Molenaar et  al. (2010, p. 8): “…the sum of 
which (contingency) is added to the base estimate to com-
plete the project cost estimate”. Indeed, buffers set up to 
cover threats have positive arithmetical sign.
Turning to companies A and B, the Phase 2 survey 
showed that while company B has a corporate opportuni-
ties management procedure (in the company’s procedural 
documents, the opportunities are called “unpriced objec-
tives”), company A has no such a kind of procedure. Dur-
ing the interviews that took place in Phase 3, both the pro-
gram managers and all the interviewed project managers 
stated that they usually identify, assess and value potential-
ly useful opportunities in order to optimize projects. This 
was corroborated by a number of reference documents 
that the authors analyzed. Furthermore, even though com-
pany B seems to manage opportunities in a more advanced 
way than company A, both firms price the opportunities 
identified in the same way: As less cost and/or less time to 
completion. This fact was confirmed by both the program 
managers and all the interviewed project managers of A 
and B, as well as being shown in project documents. On 
the basis on this evidence and inference from the litera-
ture, negative time and/or cost contingency are defined as 
the valuation of opportunities as less time or cost. The sum 
of negative contingencies is subtracted from the base esti-
mate to complete the project cost estimate.
Summarizing, construction companies set up two dif-
ferent types of time and cost contingencies: positive buff-
ers to hedge threats and negative buffers to capture op-
portunities. Thus, a negative contingency is defined as a 
potential reduction of deterministic cost and time esti-
mates. This finding fits in with the Chapman and Ward 
(2003) approach, who argue that since both opportunities 
and threats arise throughout construction process, they 
ought to be jointly managed. Chapman and Ward (2003) 
build their case on the interactive nature of risks, which 
are comprised of both opportunities and threats. In this 
regard, Figure 2 depicts an example project whose risk 
profile is slightly negative. Rectangles X and Y respectively 
represent the total amount of positive contingency – what 
is in turn a valuation of project threats – and negative con-
tingency – a valuation of project opportunities. Since the 
area of rectangle X is greater than the area of rectangle Y, 
the impact of threats is greater than the impact of opportu-
nities. Figure 2 also depicts two additional rectangles – W 
and Z – whose areas respectively represent the total deter-
ministic cost (or time) estimate and the total cost (or time) 
to complete the project objective. The equation included 
in Figure 2 would be the algebraic expression of the con-
straining effect of the deterministic cost (or time) estimate 
and cost (or time) project objectives, which as above dis-
cussed, implies that the size of cost and time contingency 
should be set up within the limits of such constraints. At 
this point, the authors would like to stress that it is not the 
intent of this research to describe how companies size each 
of those rectangles, but rather to describe the relationship 
among them regardless of size.
Figure 2. Joint management of positive and negative 
contingencies
Conclusions
In the construction phase, the construction companies 
analyzed set hidden and therefore specific, rather than 
explicit and generic, time and cost contingencies to hedge 
threats that could jeopardize project success, i.e. positive 
contingencies. This shows that the relationship among 
contractor’s crew members is based – at least regarding 
risk management – on mistrust (R1-Q1: Mistrust among 
contractor’s crew members determine time and cost con-
tingency management). At the same time, the research 
shows that contractors define time and cost contingencies 
to price opportunities that could improve the chances of 
project success, thereby providing insight into a previously 
undescribed form of contingency: the negative contin-
gency (R2-Q1: Pricing of opportunities through negative 
contingencies). The research also showed that construc-
tion companies jointly manage both types of contingency 
(i.e. positive and negative). These two results supplement 
and extend to the construction phase of projects and to 
time contingencies what other authors discovered regard-
ing bidding processes and cost contingencies. Project 
and program managers are the main decision-makers for 
contingency management. However, in this research, they 
were not found to work as a team. Indeed, while program 
managers set project objectives to consciously constrain 
the size of contingencies (R2-Q1: Time and cost con-
tingencies restraint by project management objectives), 
project managers establish the contingency in a hidden man-
ner, revealing an existing mistrust among crew members 
(R1-Q1: Mistrust among contractor’s crew members deter-
mine time and cost contingency management). This result 
expands the above described view, already described in 
literature, on the constraining nature of project objectives. 
In addition, this result confirms the role of project manag-
ers as decision-makers on contingency management, as 
well as highlights the active role of program managers on 
contingency management.
In addition to the above described specific contribu-
tions to the body of knowledge, from a broader point of 
view, the research also contribute to shed light into an 
issue scarcely discussed in literature: How construction 
companies manage time and cost contingencies during 
the execution phase of projects. The research results enable 
a better understanding of the actual behavior of general 
contractors, which contributes to paving the way for devel-
oping enhanced methods for contingencies management. 
More broadly, the results of this research align with 
and extend research in contingency management. This re-
search shows that the contingency management systems 
in the analyzed companies contain deficiencies. Literature, 
as described above, shows that these deficiencies are not 
exclusive to the analyzed companies and, therefore, they 
represent opportunities for industry improvement. The 
companies used hidden and specific time and cost buff-
ers, rather than explicit and generic buffers, as well as the 
contingency management systems in both companies lack 
a broad procedural framework. Nonetheless, such short-
comings might not result from conscious decisions, but 
they may be a consequence of the prevailing mistrust 
among the contractor’s team members. In short, this mis-
trust might well be described as the root cause of those 
flaws. Tackling such lack of trust is strategic for construc-
tion companies. On the basis of these ideas, construction 
companies studied might well analyze how to overcome 
such a mistrust-based relationship among their crew 
members as a way to enhance their competitiveness.
The results of this research, as well as the limitations, 
open the door to a wide range of future investigation. 
Further exploration of positive and negative contingency 
management is particularly noteworthy in this respect. 
Additional investigation as to how companies constrain 
contingency management by means of project objectives 
and how they specifically size contingencies within such 
constraints are warranted. Even though the research was 
not completely exhaustive and has some limitations (e.g. 
the case study sample size and examination in only the 
Spanish context), the authors can claim the generaliza-
tion of the results to a specific domain (i.e. the construc-
tion phase of civil engineering and building construction 
projects carried out by large and medium-sized Spanish 
general contractors with any degree of integration between 
the developer and the contractor). Such generalization is 
based on the fact that during Phase 5, the program man-
agers of companies other than A and B (companies E, F, 
G, H, I, J) expressed their agreement with the research 
findings as a group. Additional research into similar prac-
tices in small companies, subcontractors or other cultural 
environments would provide for a better understanding of 
the applicability of the results. Exploring companies out-
side of the field analyzed would also further the ability to 
generalize the results.
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